Bulygin argued, in the context of the justification of judicial decisions on facts, that the truth of factual statements depends on the relevant semantic rules and on the facts to which the statements refer, and that in order to establish such facts the judge needs sufficient evidence. The present work discusses whether this involves a conception of proof as knowledge and the idea that judges must acquire knowledge of the relevant facts. Bulygin’s claims are compared with distinct positions (Kelsen, Ferrer and Brewer) and are defended by proposing a reformulation focused on judicial knowledge of evidence.

Prova e conoscenza dei fatti. Alcune riflessioni a partire da Bulygin

Canale, Damiano
;
Tuzet, Giovanni
2022

Abstract

Bulygin argued, in the context of the justification of judicial decisions on facts, that the truth of factual statements depends on the relevant semantic rules and on the facts to which the statements refer, and that in order to establish such facts the judge needs sufficient evidence. The present work discusses whether this involves a conception of proof as knowledge and the idea that judges must acquire knowledge of the relevant facts. Bulygin’s claims are compared with distinct positions (Kelsen, Ferrer and Brewer) and are defended by proposing a reformulation focused on judicial knowledge of evidence.
2022
9788413814360
Moreso, José Juan; Navarro, Pablo E.; Rodríguez, Jorge Luis; Ferrer Beltrán, Jordi
Eugenio Bulygin en la teoría del derecho contemporánea. Volumen 1
Canale, Damiano; Tuzet, Giovanni
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11565/4052852
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