Private equity and advisors in mergers and acquisitions

This book contains three chapters, which are self-contained but share two common themes, private equity and the role of advisors in mergers and acquisitions. The first chapter is a study of how social networks that are formed by previous employment relations affect private equity firms’ choice of financial advisors. A financial advisor is more likely to advice on a transaction if a former employee is one of the private equity professionals who constitute the deal team for the particular transaction. In turn, information and deals are sourced to private equity firms from sell-side financial advisors within the previous employment network. The second chapter focuses on the potential conflicts of interest that may arise when an advisor to a firm targeted in a merger or acquisition is simultaneously involved in financing the bidder. Overall, the results suggest that investment banks in these situations may not have fulfilled their obligation of obtaining the highest possible price on behalf of the seller. The third chapter examines the particulars of quick flip investments and three hypotheses that may explain their prevalence. Private equity firms typically are long term investors, but occasionally exits take place in less than 18 months. Results point to that such quick flips may partly be due to conflicting interests between the limited and general partners.