PRODOTTO NON ANCORA VALIDATO
Attenzione! I dati visualizzati non sono stati sottoposti a validazione da parte dell'ateneo
Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento:
|Titolo:||Independence and Accountability in Supervision: Comparing Central Banks with Financial Authorities|
|Data di pubblicazione:||2008|
|Autori interni:||MASCIANDARO, DONATO|
|Autori:||D. MASCIANDARO; M. TAYLOR AND M. QUINTYN|
|Titolo del libro:||Frontiers in Central Banking|
|Tutti i curatori:||P. SIKLOS; MT BOHL AND M. WOHAR|
|Abstract:||Unlike the monetary policy function which is nowadays invariably the core function of a central bank, the supervisory function is being performed by a variety of institutions for whom there is less consensus about the governance model than for central banks as monetary policy agents. This paper analyzes empirically recent trends in, and determinants of, financial supervisory governance, with special attention to the role of the central bank as supervisor. As its starting point, the paper identifies the similarities and differences between our analysis and the central bank literature in defining the two key features of a good governance: independence and accountability. Then we calculate the levels of supervisory independence and accountability in 55 countries, disentangling the institutional differences between supervisory regimes governed by central banks from those in which a different authority is in charge of supervision. Finally, the empirical analysis of the determinants of emerging independence and accountability arrangements indicates that the quality of public sector governance plays a decisive role in establishing accountability arrangements, more than independence arrangements. Politicians’ decisions on the degree of independence and accountability of their supervisors seem to be driven by a different set of considerations. Only polity is present in both, meaning that the more mature a democracy is, the more likely it is that higher degrees of independence and accountability will be granted. Accountability is additionally driven by crisis experiences, while independence is influenced by a kind of bandwagon effect. The results also show that the likelihood for establishing governance arrangements suitable for the supervisory task seems to be higher when the supervisor is located outside the central bank.|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||20 - Contributo in volume Capitolo o Saggio Scientifico|
File in questo prodotto:
Non ci sono file associati a questo prodotto.
- PubMed Central loading...
I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.