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EnglishRecourse to independent directors by private equity investors is not tied to performance increases. We draw this conclusion from analyzing a unique data set representative of the European context: all deals made by Italian closed-end funds from 1999 to 2003. Our study shows, in fact, that corporate governance does not impact the rate of return on a deal. Performance, instead, is driven by the characteristics of an initiative (exit-way, holding period and shareholding). Further, we find that independent directors are involved in deals requiring greater skills and know-how. They tend to resign when performance is unsatisfactory. Moreover, these professionals improve deal performance if their commitment with the management company lasts throughout the deal and if there is a continual turnover of these directors.
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| Titolo: | "Dependent or Independent? The Performance Contribution of Board Members in Italian Venture-Backed Firms" | |
| Data di pubblicazione: | 2006 | |
| Autori: | ||
| Autori: | Caselli, Stefano | |
| Rivista: | CORPORATE OWNERSHIP & CONTROL | |
| Abstract: | Recourse to independent directors by private equity investors is not tied to performance increases. We draw this conclusion from analyzing a unique data set representative of the European context: all deals made by Italian closed-end funds from 1999 to 2003. Our study shows, in fact, that corporate governance does not impact the rate of return on a deal. Performance, instead, is driven by the characteristics of an initiative (exit-way, holding period and shareholding). Further, we find that independent directors are involved in deals requiring greater skills and know-how. They tend to resign when performance is unsatisfactory. Moreover, these professionals improve deal performance if their commitment with the management company lasts throughout the deal and if there is a continual turnover of these directors. | |
| Appare nelle tipologie: | 01 - Article in academic journal / Articolo su rivista scientifica |
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