Traditional Constitutional Arrangements and the Separation of Powers: A Difficult Relationship in Continental Europe Micro Jurisdictions

The chapter analyses the impact that the diminutive size of three continental Europe microstates, two monarchies and one republic – namely the two Principalities of Monaco and of Liechtenstein and the Republic of San Marino – has upon their constitutional arrangements, in particular when it comes to the balance of powers between the different branches of government. The main issue with microstates is their need to strike a balance between the maintenance of their traditional institutions on the one hand and the need be receptive the development of the European constitutionalism on the other hand. Their constitutional systems are quite unusual in a comparative perspective, being anchored to a distinctive legal and historical tradition. The transplant of the pillars of European constitutionalism, such as the separation of powers, may be problematic in the sense that it may endanger the traditional institutional arrangements. Microstates are more concerned that normal size states of the preservation of their constitutional identity, because they perceive that a total adjustment to core principles of constitutionalism may cause their system to implode. The chapter will then discuss the criticalities of these traditional institutional arrangements and the recent attempts of reform. In particular, what emerges from the comparison of these three microstates is that they are all characterised by a pivotal institution – the Principe in the two Principalities and the Grand and General Council in San Marino – with respect to whom the system of checks and balances seems to work poorly or just in theory.