La governance delle autorità di vigilanza: teoria e pratica

After the crisis policymakers have burdened financial supervisory authorities with further tasks and granted them wider powers. It is therefore even more important than before that such organizations perform their tasks effectively. Unfortunately, given the combination of weak market discipline and intense agency problems within the organization, this outcome cannot be taken for granted. An understanding of the peculiar identity of such organizations' multiple principals and the incentives of their agents is thus needed to assess the effectiveness of the various strategies policymakers can rely upon to govern these organizations. Having described two rather opposite ways to do so, i.e. the American S.E.C. [Securities and Exchange Commission] political model and the Dutch A.F.M. [Autoriteit Financiële Markten] corporate governance model, this article applies the agency framework to assess the Italian securities regulator's governance and concludes by putting forth some policy proposals to improve it.