Essays in Microeconomic Theory

This dissertation consists of three essays in microeconomic theory. The first chapter, co-authored with Daria Stepushina, examines equilibrium dynamics in a setting where private information about product quality can be disclosed by the seller and acquired by the buyer. This chapter studies an asymmetric information buyer-seller model with voluntary disclosure, characterizes equilibrium strategies, and analyzes the role of information costs and an (im)perfect authentication technology. The second chapter analyzes Bayesian persuasion in a network context, focusing on heterogeneous receivers and correlated messages. The sender aims to maximize the adoption of her preferred action by skeptical receivers without dissuading believers. This chapter introduces a novel definition for soft news strategies in networks and presents results on their characterization. The third chapter investigates the influence of pre-electoral polls on electoral outcomes. It considers strategic behavior among voters and pollsters and addresses empirical discrepancies between poll predictions and actual results. By proposing a theoretical model, this chapter aims to explain the mechanisms behind bandwagon and underdog effects, study competition among pollsters with misaligned interests, and explore the potential for polls to influence electoral outcomes.