We analyze the infinite repetition with imperfect feedback of a simultaneous or sequential game, assuming that players are strategically sophisticated---but impatient---expected-utility maximizers. Sophisticated strategic reasoning in the repeated game is combined with belief updating to provide a foundation for a refinement of self-confirming equilibrium. In particular, we model strategic sophistication as rationality and common strong belief in rationality. Then, we combine belief updating and sophisticated reasoning to provide sufficient conditions for a kind of learning--that is, the ability, in the limit, to exactly forecast the sequence of future observations--thus showing that impatient agents end up playing a sequence of self-confirming equilibria in strongly rationalizable conjectures of the one-period game.

Sophisticated reasoning, learning, and equilibrium in repeated games with imperfect feedback

Battigalli, Pierpaolo
;
Bordoli, Davide
In corso di stampa

Abstract

We analyze the infinite repetition with imperfect feedback of a simultaneous or sequential game, assuming that players are strategically sophisticated---but impatient---expected-utility maximizers. Sophisticated strategic reasoning in the repeated game is combined with belief updating to provide a foundation for a refinement of self-confirming equilibrium. In particular, we model strategic sophistication as rationality and common strong belief in rationality. Then, we combine belief updating and sophisticated reasoning to provide sufficient conditions for a kind of learning--that is, the ability, in the limit, to exactly forecast the sequence of future observations--thus showing that impatient agents end up playing a sequence of self-confirming equilibria in strongly rationalizable conjectures of the one-period game.
In corso di stampa
2024
Battigalli, Pierpaolo; Bordoli, Davide
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11565/4065796
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