We define a new notion of equilibrium for nonatomic anonymous games, termed epsilon-estimated equilibrium, and prove its existence for any positive s. This notion encompasses and brings to nonatomic games recent concepts of equilibrium such as self-confirming, peer-confirming, and Berk-Nash. This augmented scope is our main motivation. Our approach also resolves some conceptual problems present in Schmeidler (1973) pointed out by Shapley.

Equilibria of nonatomic anonymous games

Cerreia Vioglio, Simone;Maccheroni, Fabio
;
2022-01-01

Abstract

We define a new notion of equilibrium for nonatomic anonymous games, termed epsilon-estimated equilibrium, and prove its existence for any positive s. This notion encompasses and brings to nonatomic games recent concepts of equilibrium such as self-confirming, peer-confirming, and Berk-Nash. This augmented scope is our main motivation. Our approach also resolves some conceptual problems present in Schmeidler (1973) pointed out by Shapley.
2022
Cerreia Vioglio, Simone; Maccheroni, Fabio; Schmeidler, David
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11565/4052126
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