We define a new notion of equilibrium for nonatomic anonymous games, termed epsilon-estimated equilibrium, and prove its existence for any positive s. This notion encompasses and brings to nonatomic games recent concepts of equilibrium such as self-confirming, peer-confirming, and Berk-Nash. This augmented scope is our main motivation. Our approach also resolves some conceptual problems present in Schmeidler (1973) pointed out by Shapley.
Equilibria of nonatomic anonymous games
Cerreia Vioglio, Simone;Maccheroni, Fabio
;
2022
Abstract
We define a new notion of equilibrium for nonatomic anonymous games, termed epsilon-estimated equilibrium, and prove its existence for any positive s. This notion encompasses and brings to nonatomic games recent concepts of equilibrium such as self-confirming, peer-confirming, and Berk-Nash. This augmented scope is our main motivation. Our approach also resolves some conceptual problems present in Schmeidler (1973) pointed out by Shapley.
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