The debate on structural reforms of the banking system, particularly devoted to break-up commercial and investments banks, finds out whether a full or partial banking split could reach the goal to make banks more safe and sound and to reduce the cost of bail-out. We compare different proposals pointing out their theoretical assumptions and expected results. Since the regulatory reaction to the crisis was a reinforcement of the prudential model along with structural solutions, we conclude that such a mixed model could fail the purpose to resolve the trade-off between safety and efficiency.
Regulating core and non-core banking activities. The unanswered question
Sironi Andrea;Gabbi Giampaolo
2015
Abstract
The debate on structural reforms of the banking system, particularly devoted to break-up commercial and investments banks, finds out whether a full or partial banking split could reach the goal to make banks more safe and sound and to reduce the cost of bail-out. We compare different proposals pointing out their theoretical assumptions and expected results. Since the regulatory reaction to the crisis was a reinforcement of the prudential model along with structural solutions, we conclude that such a mixed model could fail the purpose to resolve the trade-off between safety and efficiency.File in questo prodotto:
File | Dimensione | Formato | |
---|---|---|---|
Regulating_Gabbi.pdf
non disponibili
Descrizione: capitolo
Tipologia:
Pdf editoriale (Publisher's layout)
Licenza:
NON PUBBLICO - Accesso privato/ristretto
Dimensione
314.82 kB
Formato
Adobe PDF
|
314.82 kB | Adobe PDF | Visualizza/Apri |
I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.