How does dignity of terrorism victims find a place in the challenging balance between freedom of expression and national security? This chapter addresses the issue by examining how humiliation of terrorism victims is dealt with, from a legal point of view, in a few selected Western European countries. In particular, in some cases, ‘glorification offences’ encompass not only behavior such as the encouragement, praise, propaganda and exaltation of past terrorist acts, but they may also include (expressly, in some jurisdictions, for example Spain) the humiliation and contempt of victims of terrorism and/or their families. On the one hand, these limitations of speech aim at protecting victims’ dignity; on the other hand, they pave the way for potential abuses. More clearly, while freedom of expression is traditionally conceived as one of the main tools to guarantee human dignity, here, on the contrary, speech could entail gross violations of human dignity, since it humiliates terrorism victims and their relatives already affected by the terrorist violence. Consequently, by punishing the humiliation of terrorism victims, lawmakers protect human dignity, but, at the same time, act to reinforce national security. Therefore, a sort of ‘triangulation’ of the interests at stake can be envisaged, with the risk of functionalising the protection of human dignity to securitarian policies. This research aims to draw some guidelines in order to avoid such abuses and maintain limitations to freedom of expression within the constraints of the rule of law, whose essence should not be reshaped by the need to fight terrorism.
Humiliation of terrorism victims: is human dignity becoming a ‘National Security Tool’?
Arianna Vedaschi
2020
Abstract
How does dignity of terrorism victims find a place in the challenging balance between freedom of expression and national security? This chapter addresses the issue by examining how humiliation of terrorism victims is dealt with, from a legal point of view, in a few selected Western European countries. In particular, in some cases, ‘glorification offences’ encompass not only behavior such as the encouragement, praise, propaganda and exaltation of past terrorist acts, but they may also include (expressly, in some jurisdictions, for example Spain) the humiliation and contempt of victims of terrorism and/or their families. On the one hand, these limitations of speech aim at protecting victims’ dignity; on the other hand, they pave the way for potential abuses. More clearly, while freedom of expression is traditionally conceived as one of the main tools to guarantee human dignity, here, on the contrary, speech could entail gross violations of human dignity, since it humiliates terrorism victims and their relatives already affected by the terrorist violence. Consequently, by punishing the humiliation of terrorism victims, lawmakers protect human dignity, but, at the same time, act to reinforce national security. Therefore, a sort of ‘triangulation’ of the interests at stake can be envisaged, with the risk of functionalising the protection of human dignity to securitarian policies. This research aims to draw some guidelines in order to avoid such abuses and maintain limitations to freedom of expression within the constraints of the rule of law, whose essence should not be reshaped by the need to fight terrorism.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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