The constitutional impact of union citizenship

The purpose of this paper is to revisit, and to a certain extent challenge, the debate on the constitutional effects of Union citizenship. The scholarship, the present writer included, has extensively analysed the effects of Union citizenship and has almost consistently argued that such effects are of a constitutional significance. However, after more than ten years of case law, and almost twenty years since Union citizenship was introduced in the Maastricht Treaty, the time is ripe to question whether Union citizenship is a concept of real Constitutional significance, or rather whether Union citizenship is only a limited step that, only partially affects the constitutional telos of the Treaty, mainly by expanding its scope in some circumstances. Here, one should note how the debate, which involves social scientists as well as lawyers, has gone in one of two, often overlapping, directions: a highly theoretical analysis of the consequences of challenging the link between national-state/nationality and citizenship; and an analysis of the consequences of the Court’s interpretation of the citizenship provisions, both in terms of the challenge it poses to traditional national-based structures, and in particular to the welfare state; and in terms of its broader legal constitutional relevance. In this contribution, I will focus only on the latter aspect, to assess whether the constitutional impact of Union citizenship might not need to be reconsidered. In order to do so, I will start by recalling the terms of the debate and how the scholarship has construed the constitutional challenge posed by Union citizenship. I will then turn to assess the constitutional implications of citizenship on both the national and the Community dimension. I will then analyse the recent ruling in Förster, as well as on the limitation to the scope of the citizenship provisions as currently interpreted by the Court.