Research on managing interpartner risk underscores the roles of informal and formal safeguards, such as ownership and contractual controls that regulate the partner’s behavior. We extend this research by focusing on the interplay between trust with managerial control and their contributions to value creation in alliances. We predict that the value that a firm creates in alliances will increase with the trust that evolves via recurrent alliances with the same partner and due to the managerial control instituted by a dedicated alliance function that facilitates centralization, standardization, and formalization of alliance management practices. In turn, we expect that the partner’s dedicated alliance function will restrict the firm’s ability to capture value in alliances. However, contrary to expectations, our analysis of more than 15,000 alliances in the software industry reveals that, although a firm’s dedicated alliance function can enhance managerial control, it restricts the firm’s ability to create value, especially in recurrent alliances with the same partner, where it undermines relational mechanisms such as trust. Furthermore, trust that evolves in recurrent alliances and the partner’s dedicated alliance function can benefit the firm by facilitating communication, coordination, and commitment with the partner. Our study sheds new light on the role of managerial control and its substitution with trust in mitigating interpartner risk and creating value in alliances. It shows that attempts to restrict interpartner risk can, in some cases, increase value appropriation by the partner at the firm’s expense.

Dedicated alliance function vs. partner-specific experience: alternative mechanisms for managing interpartner risk in strategic alliances

Lavie, Dovev
2020

Abstract

Research on managing interpartner risk underscores the roles of informal and formal safeguards, such as ownership and contractual controls that regulate the partner’s behavior. We extend this research by focusing on the interplay between trust with managerial control and their contributions to value creation in alliances. We predict that the value that a firm creates in alliances will increase with the trust that evolves via recurrent alliances with the same partner and due to the managerial control instituted by a dedicated alliance function that facilitates centralization, standardization, and formalization of alliance management practices. In turn, we expect that the partner’s dedicated alliance function will restrict the firm’s ability to capture value in alliances. However, contrary to expectations, our analysis of more than 15,000 alliances in the software industry reveals that, although a firm’s dedicated alliance function can enhance managerial control, it restricts the firm’s ability to create value, especially in recurrent alliances with the same partner, where it undermines relational mechanisms such as trust. Furthermore, trust that evolves in recurrent alliances and the partner’s dedicated alliance function can benefit the firm by facilitating communication, coordination, and commitment with the partner. Our study sheds new light on the role of managerial control and its substitution with trust in mitigating interpartner risk and creating value in alliances. It shows that attempts to restrict interpartner risk can, in some cases, increase value appropriation by the partner at the firm’s expense.
2020
9781641139083
9781641139090
Das, Tushar Kanti
Managing Interpartner risks in strategic alliances
Findikoglu, Melike N.; Lavie, Dovev
File in questo prodotto:
File Dimensione Formato  
IAP Letter.pdf

non disponibili

Descrizione:
Tipologia: Allegato per valutazione Bocconi (Attachment for Bocconi evaluation)
Licenza: NON PUBBLICO - Accesso privato/ristretto
Dimensione 145.73 kB
Formato Adobe PDF
145.73 kB Adobe PDF   Visualizza/Apri
Das_C001.pdf

non disponibili

Tipologia: Documento in Post-print (Post-print document)
Licenza: NON PUBBLICO - Accesso privato/ristretto
Dimensione 545.7 kB
Formato Adobe PDF
545.7 kB Adobe PDF   Visualizza/Apri

I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11565/4021672
Citazioni
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.pmc??? ND
  • Scopus ND
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? ND
social impact