We study which policy tool and at what level a majority chooses in order to reduce activities with negative externalities. We consider three instruments: a rule, that sets an upper limit to the activity which produces the negative externality, a quota that forces a proportional reduction of the activity, and a proportional tax on it. For all instruments the majority chooses levels which are too restrictive when the activity is performed mainly by a small fraction of the population, and when costs for reducing activities or paying taxes are sufficiently convex. Also a majority may prefer an instrument different than what a social planner would choose; for instance a rule when the social planner would choose a tax.
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Titolo: | Regulation versus taxation | |
Data di pubblicazione: | 2014 | |
Autori: | ||
Autori: | Alesina, Alberto; Passarelli, Francesco | |
Rivista: | JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS | |
Abstract: | We study which policy tool and at what level a majority chooses in order to reduce activities with negative externalities. We consider three instruments: a rule, that sets an upper limit to the activity which produces the negative externality, a quota that forces a proportional reduction of the activity, and a proportional tax on it. For all instruments the majority chooses levels which are too restrictive when the activity is performed mainly by a small fraction of the population, and when costs for reducing activities or paying taxes are sufficiently convex. Also a majority may prefer an instrument different than what a social planner would choose; for instance a rule when the social planner would choose a tax. | |
Digital Object Identifier (DOI): | http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2013.09.001 | |
Appare nelle tipologie: | 01 - Article in academic journal / Articolo su rivista scientifica |