We find that the centralized precolonial political institutions of African ethnic groups reduced corruption and fostered the rule of law in colonial and postcolonial Africa. These results complement our earlier finding (Gennaioli and Rainer 2005) that precolonial centralization improved public goods provision in colonial and postcolonial Africa. The data support the view that precolonial institutions are crucial to understanding governmental quality in Africa and in former colonies more generally. The evidence also stresses the desirability of centralization when unaccountable local elites capture local politics for private gain.
Precolonial Centralization and Institutional Quality in Africa
GENNAIOLI, NICOLA;
2006
Abstract
We find that the centralized precolonial political institutions of African ethnic groups reduced corruption and fostered the rule of law in colonial and postcolonial Africa. These results complement our earlier finding (Gennaioli and Rainer 2005) that precolonial centralization improved public goods provision in colonial and postcolonial Africa. The data support the view that precolonial institutions are crucial to understanding governmental quality in Africa and in former colonies more generally. The evidence also stresses the desirability of centralization when unaccountable local elites capture local politics for private gain.File in questo prodotto:
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