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EnglishThis paper studies a model where exclusive dealing (ED) can both promote investment and foreclose a more efficient supplier. Since ED promotes the incumbent seller's investment, the seller and the buyer realize a greater surplus from bilateral trade under exclusivity. Hence, the parties involved may sign an ED contract thta excludes a more efficient entrant in circumstances where ED would not arise absent investment. The paper therefore invites a more cautious attitude towards appective possible investment promotion arguments as a defence for ED.
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http://hdl.handle.net/11565/3738447| Titolo: | Exclusive dealing: investment promotion may facilitate inefficient foreclosure |
| Data di pubblicazione: | 2012 |
| Autori interni: | FUMAGALLI, CHIARA |
| Autori: | C. Fumagalli; M. Motta; T. Roende |
| Rivista: | JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS |
| Abstract: | This paper studies a model where exclusive dealing (ED) can both promote investment and foreclose a more efficient supplier. Since ED promotes the incumbent seller's investment, the seller and the buyer realize a greater surplus from bilateral trade under exclusivity. Hence, the parties involved may sign an ED contract thta excludes a more efficient entrant in circumstances where ED would not arise absent investment. The paper therefore invites a more cautious attitude towards appective possible investment promotion arguments as a defence for ED. |
| Appare nelle tipologie: | 01 - Articolo su rivista Scientifica |
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