While offering a literature review regarding several aspects and pitfalls of performance measurement and compensation literature and practice, we discuss the separation between corporate performance measurement systems (CPMSs) and incentive plans for chief executive officer (CEOIPs). Through performance measurement and compensation, organizations align competing interests and achieve management control. CPMS orient organizational actions toward organizational goals. CEOIP orient CEOs' actions toward shareholders' value. Despite the common nature (i.e., management control mechanisms) and, thus, purpose (i.e., influence on actions) of CPMS and CEOIP, both literature and practice neglect the link connecting the two mechanisms. In search for an explanation, we develop a framework that examines the link between CPMS and CEOIP under the three forms of governance proposed by transaction cost economics—namely, markets, hierarchies, and hybrids. Whereas in markets and hierarchies the control problem can be solved with a focus on one mechanism (i.e., CEOIP and CPMS, respectively), hybrid governance structures require the integration of CPMS and CEOIP. By exploring areas of integration between CPMS and CEOIP, we generate questions for future research. We expect that the integration between CPMS and CEOIP could benefit the alignment of interests and lead to more effective management control within modern organizations.

The missing link between CEO incentive plan and corporate performance measurement systems

DOSSI, ANDREA;ZONI, LAURA
2009

Abstract

While offering a literature review regarding several aspects and pitfalls of performance measurement and compensation literature and practice, we discuss the separation between corporate performance measurement systems (CPMSs) and incentive plans for chief executive officer (CEOIPs). Through performance measurement and compensation, organizations align competing interests and achieve management control. CPMS orient organizational actions toward organizational goals. CEOIP orient CEOs' actions toward shareholders' value. Despite the common nature (i.e., management control mechanisms) and, thus, purpose (i.e., influence on actions) of CPMS and CEOIP, both literature and practice neglect the link connecting the two mechanisms. In search for an explanation, we develop a framework that examines the link between CPMS and CEOIP under the three forms of governance proposed by transaction cost economics—namely, markets, hierarchies, and hybrids. Whereas in markets and hierarchies the control problem can be solved with a focus on one mechanism (i.e., CEOIP and CPMS, respectively), hybrid governance structures require the integration of CPMS and CEOIP. By exploring areas of integration between CPMS and CEOIP, we generate questions for future research. We expect that the integration between CPMS and CEOIP could benefit the alignment of interests and lead to more effective management control within modern organizations.
2009
The missing link between CEO incentive plan and corporate performance measurement systems
Dossi, Andrea; Zoni, Laura
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11565/3728399
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