Several legal arguments use the notion of ratio legis in order to sustain a normative conclusion, in particular the argument from analogy and some forms of teleological argumentation. However, determining the ratio is often a difficult and controversial task. In this paper we look firstly at the speech acts typically performed by legal practitioners in order to determine the ratio and, secondly, we take into account the argumentative commitments they undertake in so doing and the argumentative constraints put on them. This will lead us to distinguish different uses of the notion of ratio legis and to ask on what conditions each of them is justified. © 2009 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.
What is the reason for this rule? An inferential account of the ratio legis
CANALE, DAMIANO;TUZET, GIOVANNI
2010
Abstract
Several legal arguments use the notion of ratio legis in order to sustain a normative conclusion, in particular the argument from analogy and some forms of teleological argumentation. However, determining the ratio is often a difficult and controversial task. In this paper we look firstly at the speech acts typically performed by legal practitioners in order to determine the ratio and, secondly, we take into account the argumentative commitments they undertake in so doing and the argumentative constraints put on them. This will lead us to distinguish different uses of the notion of ratio legis and to ask on what conditions each of them is justified. © 2009 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.