In a common currency area, the common central bank sets a uniform rate of inflation across countries, taking into account the area's economic conditions. Suppose countries in recession favor a more expansionary policy than countries in expansion: when national business cycles are not fully synchronized, a conflict of interest between members arises. If member governments have an informational advantage over the state of their domestic economy, such conflict may create an adverse selection problem: national authorities overemphasize their shocks in order to shape the common policy towards their needs. This creates an inefficiency over and above the one-policy-fits-all cost discussed in the optimal currency area literature. In order to minimize this extra-burden of asymmetric information, monetary policy must over-react to large symmetric shocks and under-react to asymmetric shocks of different sizes. Copyright 2005 by The Ohio State University.
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Titolo: | Asymmetric information and monetary policy in common currency areas |
Data di pubblicazione: | 2005 |
Autori: | |
Autori: | Manasse, Paolo; L., Bottazzi |
Rivista: | JOURNAL OF MONEY, CREDIT, AND BANKING |
Abstract: | In a common currency area, the common central bank sets a uniform rate of inflation across countries, taking into account the area's economic conditions. Suppose countries in recession favor a more expansionary policy than countries in expansion: when national business cycles are not fully synchronized, a conflict of interest between members arises. If member governments have an informational advantage over the state of their domestic economy, such conflict may create an adverse selection problem: national authorities overemphasize their shocks in order to shape the common policy towards their needs. This creates an inefficiency over and above the one-policy-fits-all cost discussed in the optimal currency area literature. In order to minimize this extra-burden of asymmetric information, monetary policy must over-react to large symmetric shocks and under-react to asymmetric shocks of different sizes. Copyright 2005 by The Ohio State University. |
Codice identificativo Scopus: | 2-s2.0-24144491365 |
Codice identificativo ISI: | WOS:000230897400001 |
Appare nelle tipologie: | 01 - Article in academic journal / Articolo su rivista Scientifica |