Using data concerning all family firms listed at the Italian Stock Exchange between 2001 and 2005, it is showed that agency theory prescriptions and monitoring activities impact differently on family firm value and profitability. Specifically, non founder family firms benefit from a low level of board and inside ownership and a high level of stockholder and foreign investors ownership, because they must face high agency costs. On the contrary, founder family firms benefit from a high level of board and insider ownership, a low level of stockholder and foreign investor ownership owing to their context of lower agency costs.
Family Firms' Performance and Agency Theory. What's going on from the italian market?
CASELLI, STEFANO;GATTI, STEFANO
2008
Abstract
Using data concerning all family firms listed at the Italian Stock Exchange between 2001 and 2005, it is showed that agency theory prescriptions and monitoring activities impact differently on family firm value and profitability. Specifically, non founder family firms benefit from a low level of board and inside ownership and a high level of stockholder and foreign investors ownership, because they must face high agency costs. On the contrary, founder family firms benefit from a high level of board and insider ownership, a low level of stockholder and foreign investor ownership owing to their context of lower agency costs.File in questo prodotto:
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