The paper analyses the optimal design and enforcement of Leniency Programs, that grant immunity to firms involved in a cartel that cooperate in the investigations. We show that LP can have both pro-collusive and deterrence effects but that these latter prevail in the optimal scheme, requiring full immunity to all cooperating firms.
Leniency Programs and Cartel Prosecution
POLO, MICHELE
2003
Abstract
The paper analyses the optimal design and enforcement of Leniency Programs, that grant immunity to firms involved in a cartel that cooperate in the investigations. We show that LP can have both pro-collusive and deterrence effects but that these latter prevail in the optimal scheme, requiring full immunity to all cooperating firms.
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