The main point in our paper is that fiscal constitutions with a supermajority clause reduce the number of subgame-perfect equilibria in an intergenerational game of social security, and rule out all the dynamically inefficient outcomes that are possible under simple majority voting.
“Reply to Kolmer’s Comments on Constitutional “Rules” and Intergenerational Fiscal Policy”
GALASSO, VINCENZO
2000
Abstract
The main point in our paper is that fiscal constitutions with a supermajority clause reduce the number of subgame-perfect equilibria in an intergenerational game of social security, and rule out all the dynamically inefficient outcomes that are possible under simple majority voting.
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