A dynamic model of migration is developed to study whether labor mobility can hedge people against region-specific shocks, making private or public insurance redundant. The model adopts a novel timing for migration, which is argued to be the time frame suitable for analyzing risk-sharing issues. It also innovates on the existing literature by solving individual migration through convexification of the set of actions. The results show that the role of migration as an insurance mechanism is small: labor mobility cannot fully remove income differentials between regions. It is also shown that a fiscal stabilization scheme is, in general, optimal; moreover, any pure risk-sharing mechanism has no influence on migration flows.
Regional insurance and migration
Devillanova C.
2001
Abstract
A dynamic model of migration is developed to study whether labor mobility can hedge people against region-specific shocks, making private or public insurance redundant. The model adopts a novel timing for migration, which is argued to be the time frame suitable for analyzing risk-sharing issues. It also innovates on the existing literature by solving individual migration through convexification of the set of actions. The results show that the role of migration as an insurance mechanism is small: labor mobility cannot fully remove income differentials between regions. It is also shown that a fiscal stabilization scheme is, in general, optimal; moreover, any pure risk-sharing mechanism has no influence on migration flows.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.