We use a universal, extensive form interactive beliefs system to provide an epistemic characterization of a weak and a strong notion of rationalizability with independent beliefs. The weak solution concept is equivalent to backward induction in generic perfect information games where no player moves more than once in any play. The strong solution concept is related to explicability (Reny, 1992) and is outcome-equivalent to backward induction in generic games of perfect information. © 1999 Academic Press.
Interactive beliefs, epistemic independence and strong rationalizability
Battigalli P.;
1999
Abstract
We use a universal, extensive form interactive beliefs system to provide an epistemic characterization of a weak and a strong notion of rationalizability with independent beliefs. The weak solution concept is equivalent to backward induction in generic perfect information games where no player moves more than once in any play. The strong solution concept is related to explicability (Reny, 1992) and is outcome-equivalent to backward induction in generic games of perfect information. © 1999 Academic Press.
File in questo prodotto:
Non ci sono file associati a questo prodotto.
I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
