We provide an epistemic analysis of forward induction in games with complete and incomplete information. We suggest that forward induction may be usefully interpreted as a set of assumptions governing the players' belief revision processes, and define a notion of strong belief to formalize these assumptions. Building on the notion of strong belief, we provide an epistemic characterization of extensive-form rationalizability and the intuitive criterion, as well as sufficient epistemic conditions for the backward induction outcome. We also investigate the robustness of rationalizability to slight payoff uncertainity.
PRODOTTO NON ANCORA VALIDATO
Attenzione! I dati visualizzati non sono stati sottoposti a validazione da parte dell'ateneo
Titolo: | Strong belief and forward induction reasoning |
Data di pubblicazione: | 2002 |
Autori: | |
Autori: | Battigalli, Pierpaolo; Siniscalchi, M. |
Rivista: | JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY |
Abstract: | We provide an epistemic analysis of forward induction in games with complete and incomplete information. We suggest that forward induction may be usefully interpreted as a set of assumptions governing the players' belief revision processes, and define a notion of strong belief to formalize these assumptions. Building on the notion of strong belief, we provide an epistemic characterization of extensive-form rationalizability and the intuitive criterion, as well as sufficient epistemic conditions for the backward induction outcome. We also investigate the robustness of rationalizability to slight payoff uncertainity. |
Appare nelle tipologie: | 01 - Article in academic journal / Articolo su rivista Scientifica |