Federal pleading doctrine systematically misallocates epistemic risk. When courts credit defendants’ “obvious alternative explanations” at the pleading stage, they require plaintiffs to negate defendant-controlled narratives before discovery begins—imposing the burden of factual uncertainty on the party least able to bear it. What Twombly and Iqbal designed as a threshold screen for incoherent claims has been transformed, in practice, into a mechanism for resolving contested factual questions at the moment of greatest informational asymmetry.
Beyond Probability: Plausibility as Coherence in Asymmetric Litigation
Cavallini, Cesare
In corso di stampa
Abstract
Federal pleading doctrine systematically misallocates epistemic risk. When courts credit defendants’ “obvious alternative explanations” at the pleading stage, they require plaintiffs to negate defendant-controlled narratives before discovery begins—imposing the burden of factual uncertainty on the party least able to bear it. What Twombly and Iqbal designed as a threshold screen for incoherent claims has been transformed, in practice, into a mechanism for resolving contested factual questions at the moment of greatest informational asymmetry.File in questo prodotto:
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