Unilateral coercive measures under WTO law: unpacking security exceptions and seeking broader solutions to the trade-security dilemma

This article explores the intersection of trade and national security within the framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO) law, focusing on the use of unilateral coercive measures, such as sanctions, and their justification under security exceptions. The article begins with an introduction to the relationship between trade and peace, followed by a discussion of sanctions and the various sanctions regimes employed by WTO members. It then examines the justification for sanctions (or other unilateral measures like tariffs) through security exceptions under WTO law, drawing on the case law, including the Russia-Traffic in Transit, Saudi Arabia-IPR, and US-Steel and Aluminium disputes, which have shed light on the interpretation of these exceptions by WTO Panels. The paper also delves into non-violation complaints as a mechanism for addressing national security concerns beyond violation claims under WTO law.