Technocracy has come to be increasingly regarded as a threat to representative democracy. Signif-icant attention has thus been recently devoted to exploring public preferences towards technocraticinstitutions. Elected policy-makers’ attitudes have instead not been investigated as systematically.This article fills this gap by examining politicians’ views on central banks. Based on an originalelite survey of the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), we gauged elected policy-makers’ attitudes towards the mandate and policy conduct of the European Central Bank (ECB).Our findings show that the political orientation of politicians largely drives attitudes towards theECB’s institutional mandate. Interestingly, the findings from two experiments embedded in thesurvey also show that the attitudes of MEPs are not as static as ideological orientations would leadus to expect. The information set to which politicians are exposed significantly shapes their viewson both the ECB’s mandate and its policy conduct, but less on ECB independence
What do politicians think of technocratic institutions? European Parliament’s attitudes towards the European Central Bank
Masciandaro, Donato
;Romelli, Davide
2025
Abstract
Technocracy has come to be increasingly regarded as a threat to representative democracy. Signif-icant attention has thus been recently devoted to exploring public preferences towards technocraticinstitutions. Elected policy-makers’ attitudes have instead not been investigated as systematically.This article fills this gap by examining politicians’ views on central banks. Based on an originalelite survey of the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), we gauged elected policy-makers’ attitudes towards the mandate and policy conduct of the European Central Bank (ECB).Our findings show that the political orientation of politicians largely drives attitudes towards theECB’s institutional mandate. Interestingly, the findings from two experiments embedded in thesurvey also show that the attitudes of MEPs are not as static as ideological orientations would leadus to expect. The information set to which politicians are exposed significantly shapes their viewson both the ECB’s mandate and its policy conduct, but less on ECB independenceFile | Dimensione | Formato | |
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