Suboptimal dishonesty: rationality in the absence of strategic behavior in honesty experiments

This paper explores the interplay between honesty and dishonesty in individual decision-making, with a focus on reconciling two competing theories: the "moral grace" hypothesis, which posits innate honesty, and the "will" hypothesis, which suggests dishonesty is natural and requires suppression. Reviewing Abe and Greene's 2014 study, the authors discuss how neural responses, specifically in the nucleus accumbens and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, correlate with dishonest behavior and the effort required for honesty under varying reward conditions. The discussion integrates game theory and empirical findings, proposing that costs associated with dishonesty, such as guilt or shame aversion, vary among individuals and influence their utility-maximizing behaviors. The concept of "suboptimal dishonesty" emerges, highlighting cases where individuals fail to act purely in self-interest. Future research directions include further investigating these subjective costs and their neural underpinnings, as well as refining experimental paradigms to better isolate the drivers of (dis)honesty. This commentary sheds light on the complex mechanisms underlying honesty and dishonesty, emphasizing their dependence on both neural and strategic factors.