Governments use a variety of tools to discourage, impede, or limit the ability of foreign adversaries to purse their ambitions. Some of these measures seek to constrain an opponent’s capacity, while others seek to deter an opponent to take (or not) a particular action. We develop a theory to study how constraining and coercive threats interact strategically. Building on canonical models of deterrence, we first identify how coercive measures, in isolation, curb an aggressor’s transgressions. We then identify when constraining measures and the threat of coercion (deterrence), are substitutes and when they are complements. In some cases, constraining measures make deterrence effective when it would otherwise fail (constraining to deter). Our results offer insights about measuring the effectiveness of various diplomatic tools. We highlight a series of novel empirical challenges stemming from the interaction of selection effects and ecological features of a sample of country dyads, and discuss potential solutions.
Constraining to deter
Di Lonardo, Livio
;
In corso di stampa
Abstract
Governments use a variety of tools to discourage, impede, or limit the ability of foreign adversaries to purse their ambitions. Some of these measures seek to constrain an opponent’s capacity, while others seek to deter an opponent to take (or not) a particular action. We develop a theory to study how constraining and coercive threats interact strategically. Building on canonical models of deterrence, we first identify how coercive measures, in isolation, curb an aggressor’s transgressions. We then identify when constraining measures and the threat of coercion (deterrence), are substitutes and when they are complements. In some cases, constraining measures make deterrence effective when it would otherwise fail (constraining to deter). Our results offer insights about measuring the effectiveness of various diplomatic tools. We highlight a series of novel empirical challenges stemming from the interaction of selection effects and ecological features of a sample of country dyads, and discuss potential solutions.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
---|---|---|---|
Editorial Decision on AJPS47499R1.pdf
non disponibili
Descrizione: Lettera di accettazione
Tipologia:
Allegato per valutazione Bocconi (Attachment for Bocconi evaluation)
Licenza:
NON PUBBLICO - Accesso privato/ristretto
Dimensione
47.94 kB
Formato
Adobe PDF
|
47.94 kB | Adobe PDF | Visualizza/Apri |
Constraining to Deter - Final.pdf
non disponibili
Descrizione: Versione accettata dell'articolo
Tipologia:
Documento in Pre-print (Pre-print document)
Licenza:
NON PUBBLICO - Accesso privato/ristretto
Dimensione
514.41 kB
Formato
Adobe PDF
|
514.41 kB | Adobe PDF | Visualizza/Apri |
I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.