A Data-Driven Study: Monitoring and Compliance Mechanisms as a Diagnostic and Prognostic Tool of International Anticorruption Cooperation

This article focuses on text-as-data analysis to identify and compare the main patterns in the implementation of international anti-corruption rules, as well as compliance with them. It is based on the observation that an overall study of the operation and outcomes of international anti-corruption treaties’ monitoring and compliance mechanisms (MMs)’ has not yet been attempted. Its primary objectives are twofold: first, to obtain structured information in the form of data on compliance with the main anti-corruption treaties by processing the text of the reports those MMs have published since their creation; and second, by elaborating on this newly structured information (i.e., text-as-data), to examine the impact of these treaties on state behaviour. As a result, this article offers the first comprehensive review of country performance, combined with a structured legal analysis of outcomes from the angle of the interaction between international and domestic law. The findings reveal that results in implementation and compliance have been decidedly mixed. Several countries have introduced reforms to implement anti-corruption treaties, facilitate law enforcement, and ease international cooperation to investigate and prosecute corruption offences. Yet, the many problems identified with respect to prevention, particularly in European and American countries, suggest that states too often over-rely on the repressive aspects of fighting corruption and undervalue preventive mechanisms, which frequently do not exist or are inadequate. Moreover, the article identifies enduring challenges, and even signs of regression, across the different areas of prevention, criminal repression, and international cooperation that have far-reaching implications for the effectiveness of anti-corruption policies in many jurisdictions. Finally, the data obtained from the OECD demonstrates considerable disparities in enforcement among the reviewed countries; a few jurisdictions have yet to see a single foreign bribery case prosecuted. Additionallly, they offer new evidence that reasons for poor compliance are highly contextual with different implications for domestic reforms.