We study how voters’ preferences between a safe incumbent and a risky opponent change in the aftermath of a negative aggregate shock. With reference-dependent preferences, economically disappointed voters become risk lovers, and hence are attracted by the more risky candidate. Survey data on the German SOEP are consistent with our assumptions and theoretical predictions on voters’ behavior.
Economic shocks and populism
Panunzi, Fausto;Pavoni, Nicola;Tabellini, Guido
In corso di stampa
Abstract
We study how voters’ preferences between a safe incumbent and a risky opponent change in the aftermath of a negative aggregate shock. With reference-dependent preferences, economically disappointed voters become risk lovers, and hence are attracted by the more risky candidate. Survey data on the German SOEP are consistent with our assumptions and theoretical predictions on voters’ behavior.
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