We study ex post implementation in collective decision problems where monetary transfers cannot be used. We find that deterministic ex post implementation is impossible if the underlying environment is neither almost an environment with private values nor almost one with common values. Thus, desirable properties of ex post implementation such as informational robustness become difficult to achieve when preference interdependence and preference heterogeneity are both present in the environment.

The limits of ex post implementation without transfers

Feng, Tangren
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Abstract

We study ex post implementation in collective decision problems where monetary transfers cannot be used. We find that deterministic ex post implementation is impossible if the underlying environment is neither almost an environment with private values nor almost one with common values. Thus, desirable properties of ex post implementation such as informational robustness become difficult to achieve when preference interdependence and preference heterogeneity are both present in the environment.
2022
Feng, Tangren; Niemeyer, Axel; Wu, Qinggong
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11565/4051836
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