Existing works show that luck increases CEOs’ pay at their current firm. In this work, we explore how luck affects: (1) CEOs’ employment opportunities, and (2) the performance of firms that hire lucky CEOs. Our results indicate that luck increases the likelihood to get a CEO job at new companies. Conditional on moving, lucky CEOs obtain a higher pay (in absolute terms and compared to new industry peers) mostly due to higher incentive pay. Moreover, lucky CEOs tend to be hired by firms operating in less competitive industries. Despite the higher compensation they receive, we find that hiring lucky CEOs is associated with a substantial decline in firm performance.

Hiring lucky CEOs

Amore, Mario Daniele;
In corso di stampa

Abstract

Existing works show that luck increases CEOs’ pay at their current firm. In this work, we explore how luck affects: (1) CEOs’ employment opportunities, and (2) the performance of firms that hire lucky CEOs. Our results indicate that luck increases the likelihood to get a CEO job at new companies. Conditional on moving, lucky CEOs obtain a higher pay (in absolute terms and compared to new industry peers) mostly due to higher incentive pay. Moreover, lucky CEOs tend to be hired by firms operating in less competitive industries. Despite the higher compensation they receive, we find that hiring lucky CEOs is associated with a substantial decline in firm performance.
Amore, Mario Daniele; Schwenen, Sebastian
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: http://hdl.handle.net/11565/4049925
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