The article discusses the structural dynamics that will underlie the international negotiations prompted by a U.S. proposal about a minimum global tax. Section 1 outlines the main features of this proposal, while section 2 describes more in detail how home countries can upgrade their strategies against profit shifting and tax competition through a “country-by-country minimum tax” under a comprehensive agreement pursued at OECD/G20 level. The article then discusses at sections 3 and 4 how we are heading toward an “international tax regime”, a concept drawn from international relations and now brought to bear in international taxation. To address this question a grammar of tax concepts is presented about multilateralism and cooperation together with a description of how rational-choice theory can be applied to collective action problems, to draw at section 5 some preliminary conclusions about the country-by-country minimum tax regime and its impact at OECD level. The article concludes at section 6 by canvassing a potential paradigm shift in international taxation toward cooperative minilateralism, as we move in the direction of a global minimum tax.

The architecture of the country-by-country minimum tax regime proposed by the United States

Garbarino, Carlo
In corso di stampa

Abstract

The article discusses the structural dynamics that will underlie the international negotiations prompted by a U.S. proposal about a minimum global tax. Section 1 outlines the main features of this proposal, while section 2 describes more in detail how home countries can upgrade their strategies against profit shifting and tax competition through a “country-by-country minimum tax” under a comprehensive agreement pursued at OECD/G20 level. The article then discusses at sections 3 and 4 how we are heading toward an “international tax regime”, a concept drawn from international relations and now brought to bear in international taxation. To address this question a grammar of tax concepts is presented about multilateralism and cooperation together with a description of how rational-choice theory can be applied to collective action problems, to draw at section 5 some preliminary conclusions about the country-by-country minimum tax regime and its impact at OECD level. The article concludes at section 6 by canvassing a potential paradigm shift in international taxation toward cooperative minilateralism, as we move in the direction of a global minimum tax.
File in questo prodotto:
File Dimensione Formato  
Acceptance letter Florida.pdf

non disponibili

Descrizione: lettera di accettazione
Tipologia: Allegato per valutazione Bocconi (Attachment for Bocconi evaluation)
Licenza: NON PUBBLICO - Accesso privato/ristretto
Dimensione 241.85 kB
Formato Adobe PDF
241.85 kB Adobe PDF   Visualizza/Apri   Richiedi una copia
Garbarino ARCHITECTURE CBC MINIMUM TAX REGIME (us).docx

non disponibili

Tipologia: Documento in Pre-print (Pre-print document)
Licenza: NON PUBBLICO - Accesso privato/ristretto
Dimensione 86.18 kB
Formato Microsoft Word XML
86.18 kB Microsoft Word XML   Visualizza/Apri   Richiedi una copia

I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: http://hdl.handle.net/11565/4044323
Citazioni
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.pmc??? ND
  • Scopus ND
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? ND
social impact