We explore the consequences of populism for bureaucrats’ incentives by analyzing a model of delegated policymaking between politicians and bureaucrats. Populist politicians prefer a bureaucrat who implements their policy commitment, while non-populist politicians prefer a good bureaucrat with discretion.The presence of populist politicians thus determines replacement of good with bad bureaucrats and creates incentives for good bureaucrats to ‘‘feign loyalty”. We show that feigning loyalty is more prevalent when the probability of populist leadership in the future is higher and the bureaucrats’ pool of potential replacements is worse. We also show that bureaucratic turnover is higher under populists when the bureaucracy is strong and higher under non-populists when the bureaucracy is weak.
Bureaucrats under populism
Morelli, Massimo
2021
Abstract
We explore the consequences of populism for bureaucrats’ incentives by analyzing a model of delegated policymaking between politicians and bureaucrats. Populist politicians prefer a bureaucrat who implements their policy commitment, while non-populist politicians prefer a good bureaucrat with discretion.The presence of populist politicians thus determines replacement of good with bad bureaucrats and creates incentives for good bureaucrats to ‘‘feign loyalty”. We show that feigning loyalty is more prevalent when the probability of populist leadership in the future is higher and the bureaucrats’ pool of potential replacements is worse. We also show that bureaucratic turnover is higher under populists when the bureaucracy is strong and higher under non-populists when the bureaucracy is weak.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
---|---|---|---|
1-s2.0-S004727272100133X-main.pdf
non disponibili
Descrizione: articolo pubblicato
Tipologia:
Pdf editoriale (Publisher's layout)
Licenza:
NON PUBBLICO - Accesso privato/ristretto
Dimensione
530.93 kB
Formato
Adobe PDF
|
530.93 kB | Adobe PDF | Visualizza/Apri |
I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.