A quindici anni dall'introduzione del voto di lista: profili evolutivi e scenari futuri

The article analyses the topic of list voting, a technique for the election of the board of directors, which permits the representation of the minority of shareholders within the body to be elected, and which constitutes a distinctive feature of the Italian legal scenario, held as especially valuable where the ownership structure is concentrated. Without taking into account far-reaching considerations, which would imply contemplating the link between the appointment of a director by the minority of shareholders and her ability to effectively promote the interests of that minority, this study is based on the observation that, since 2005 — the year when the mechanism was drawn up — there has been a remarkable evolution of the economic and corporate environment, as well as of the overall regulatory landscape. All this suggests, having now reached a certain time span from that date, the necessity to perform a preliminary assessment of list voting. The said procedure — widely examined in the academic literature — is here considered dwelling on the intentions and goals that led to its introduction, on the different and diverse phenomena and on the innovations that have affected the legal system in the appreciable amount of time that has passed since it was enacted. List voting is studied through the lens of the aims and expectations to be achieved and the regulatory changes that affected the overall vision of the board’s composition, bearing in mind the dramatic increase in the directors’ requirements set out in legal provisions. Each of the issues and cases raised helps to draw an initial assessment of the effectiveness of the list voting technique, fifteen years after its launch into the regulatory framework, and to undertake a system-wide analysis. If, on the one hand, the mechanism seems to have proved its worth, also attracting the interest of the overseas legal experts, on the other hand, there is a strong need to curb the lawmaker’s impulse to boost the number of rules to be respected when composing the board. Hence, we propose to set a uniform direction and to allow the incumbent board to commend its own slate, especially at a time in which the same board is also called to assess interests other than the ones of shareholders only. We therefore hope that there will be a move backwards with respect to the tendency to strengthen the regulatory framework with the enactment of new provisions, but, on the contrary, to head in two different directions: the enhancement of by-laws autonomy and the improvement of the best practices set in the Codes of Corporate Governance. SOMMARIO: 1. Premessa.-2. Origini e finalità dell'istituto.-3. Evoluzione della realtà economica e del sistema normativo: un nuovo sostrato per il voto di lista.-3.1. Evoluzione della realtà economica.-3.2. Evoluzione delle funzioni del board.-3.3. Evoluzione del panorama normativo.-4. Le conseguenze problematiche dei cambiamenti.-4.1. Il problema della composizione delle liste.-4.1.2. (segue) Voto di lista e quote di genere.-4.2. Variazione del numero di consiglieri nel corso del mandato.-4.3. Presentazione delle liste e patti parasociali.-4.4. Direzione e coordinamento: la nomina di amministratori indipendenti in più società del medesimo gruppo.-4.5. Le liste presentate dai fondi di investimento.-4.6. Tra esclusività della "lista di minoranza" e ammissibilità di una "lista del consiglio di amministrazione uscente".-5. Considerazioni conclusive.