We analyze the price effect of the introduction of Collective Action Clauses (CACs) in newly issued sovereign bonds of Eurozone countries as of January 1, 2013. By allowing a majority of creditors to modify payment obligations, such clauses reduce the likelihood of holdouts while facilitating strategic default by the sovereign. We find that CAC bonds trade in the secondary market at lower yields than otherwise similar no-CAC bonds. The yield differential widens in countries with worse ratings and in those with stronger legal systems, especially if of mid-range quality. Hence, CACs are seen as pro- rather than anti-creditor provisions.

The price of law: the case of the Eurozone collective action clauses

Carletti, Elena
Membro del Collaboration Group
;
Colla, Paolo
Membro del Collaboration Group
;
Ongena, Steven
2021

Abstract

We analyze the price effect of the introduction of Collective Action Clauses (CACs) in newly issued sovereign bonds of Eurozone countries as of January 1, 2013. By allowing a majority of creditors to modify payment obligations, such clauses reduce the likelihood of holdouts while facilitating strategic default by the sovereign. We find that CAC bonds trade in the secondary market at lower yields than otherwise similar no-CAC bonds. The yield differential widens in countries with worse ratings and in those with stronger legal systems, especially if of mid-range quality. Hence, CACs are seen as pro- rather than anti-creditor provisions.
2021
2020
Carletti, Elena; Colla, Paolo; Gulati, Mitu; Ongena, Steven
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11565/4034011
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