The article addresses the so-called “doctrinal paradox”, or “discursive dilemma”, starting from some historical antecedents and moving to recent accounts (Ekins’ in particular). The paradox affects collective decision-making (by courts, legislatures, etc.) and consists in the risk that a vote on the reasons of a decision contradicts the vote on the outcome. The contributions of the article to the current debate are mainly three: a focus on the hierarchical aspects of the problem, a treatment of it with some logical and argumentative tools like the burden of proof, and a pragmatist argument which favors the method of voting on the outcome. This goes against a significant body of scholarly work that praises the method of voting on reasons.
More votes, more irrationality
Giovanni Tuzet
2019
Abstract
The article addresses the so-called “doctrinal paradox”, or “discursive dilemma”, starting from some historical antecedents and moving to recent accounts (Ekins’ in particular). The paradox affects collective decision-making (by courts, legislatures, etc.) and consists in the risk that a vote on the reasons of a decision contradicts the vote on the outcome. The contributions of the article to the current debate are mainly three: a focus on the hierarchical aspects of the problem, a treatment of it with some logical and argumentative tools like the burden of proof, and a pragmatist argument which favors the method of voting on the outcome. This goes against a significant body of scholarly work that praises the method of voting on reasons.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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