We study the relation between CEO and employee campaign contributions and find that CEO-supported political candidates receive three times more money from employees than the candidates not supported by the CEO. This relation holds around CEO departures, including plausibly exogenous departures due to retirement or death. Equity returns are significantly higher when CEO-supported candidates win elections than when employee-supported candidates win, suggesting that CEOs’ campaign contributions are more aligned with the interests of shareholders than are employee contributions. Finally, employees whose donations are misaligned with the political preferences of their CEOs are more likely to leave their employer.
Do CEOs affect employees' political choices?
Fedaseyeu, Viktar
;
2020
Abstract
We study the relation between CEO and employee campaign contributions and find that CEO-supported political candidates receive three times more money from employees than the candidates not supported by the CEO. This relation holds around CEO departures, including plausibly exogenous departures due to retirement or death. Equity returns are significantly higher when CEO-supported candidates win elections than when employee-supported candidates win, suggesting that CEOs’ campaign contributions are more aligned with the interests of shareholders than are employee contributions. Finally, employees whose donations are misaligned with the political preferences of their CEOs are more likely to leave their employer.
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CEOandEmployeePoliticalChoices_v51_RFS_Revision.pdf
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