There is a broad consensus that horizontal mergers may increase market power but may also bring cost savings. Antitrust authorities and the courts routinely seek to maximize allocative efficiency by assessing these opposing effects. The details of this exercise may vary across jurisdictions or individual cases, but on the whole the short-run questions involved in horizontal merger control would appear to be largely settled.
The innovation theory of harm: an appraisal
Michele Polo
2019
Abstract
There is a broad consensus that horizontal mergers may increase market power but may also bring cost savings. Antitrust authorities and the courts routinely seek to maximize allocative efficiency by assessing these opposing effects. The details of this exercise may vary across jurisdictions or individual cases, but on the whole the short-run questions involved in horizontal merger control would appear to be largely settled.
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Polo IToH_ALJfinal ALJ_clean (1).pdf
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