We study in a theoretical and experimental setting the interaction between belief-dependent preferences and reputation building in a finitely repeated trust game. We focus mainly on the effect of guilt aversion. In a simple two-type model, we analyze the effect of reputation building in the presence of guilt-averse trustees and derive behavioral predictions. We test these predictions in a laboratory experiment where we elicit information on trustees' belief-dependent preferences and disclose it to the paired trustor before the repeated game.
Belief-dependent preferences and reputation: experimental analysis of a repeated trust game
Attanasi, Giuseppe;Battigalli, Pierpaolo;Manzoni, Elena;
2019
Abstract
We study in a theoretical and experimental setting the interaction between belief-dependent preferences and reputation building in a finitely repeated trust game. We focus mainly on the effect of guilt aversion. In a simple two-type model, we analyze the effect of reputation building in the presence of guilt-averse trustees and derive behavioral predictions. We test these predictions in a laboratory experiment where we elicit information on trustees' belief-dependent preferences and disclose it to the paired trustor before the repeated game.File in questo prodotto:
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