We study in a theoretical and experimental setting the interaction between belief-dependent preferences and reputation building in a finitely repeated trust game. We focus mainly on the effect of guilt aversion. In a simple two-type model, we analyze the effect of reputation building in the presence of guilt-averse trustees and derive behavioral predictions. We test these predictions in a laboratory experiment where we elicit information on trustees' belief-dependent preferences and disclose it to the paired trustor before the repeated game.

Belief-dependent preferences and reputation: experimental analysis of a repeated trust game

Attanasi, Giuseppe;Battigalli, Pierpaolo;Manzoni, Elena;
2019

Abstract

We study in a theoretical and experimental setting the interaction between belief-dependent preferences and reputation building in a finitely repeated trust game. We focus mainly on the effect of guilt aversion. In a simple two-type model, we analyze the effect of reputation building in the presence of guilt-averse trustees and derive behavioral predictions. We test these predictions in a laboratory experiment where we elicit information on trustees' belief-dependent preferences and disclose it to the paired trustor before the repeated game.
2019
2018
Attanasi, Giuseppe; Battigalli, Pierpaolo; Manzoni, Elena; Nagel, Rosemarie
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11565/4014836
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