This article develops an institutional spatial theory of presidential appointments to administrative agencies that falls within the spirit of a recent line of theoretical research toward an institutional theory of the presidency. We show that when bureaucrats implement policy that results from negotiation with constituents, the ally principle—appointing political allies—holds only as a knife-edge condition. Presidents are better served by appointing administrators whose preferences partially offset the influence of organized interests. The incentives described have implications for the selection of a whole range of bureaucratic personnel at various levels, generating significant implications for the study of public management on issues such as personnel administration, representative bureaucracy, and the devolution of administrative authority.
Strategic appointments
Bertelli, Anthony
;
2007
Abstract
This article develops an institutional spatial theory of presidential appointments to administrative agencies that falls within the spirit of a recent line of theoretical research toward an institutional theory of the presidency. We show that when bureaucrats implement policy that results from negotiation with constituents, the ally principle—appointing political allies—holds only as a knife-edge condition. Presidents are better served by appointing administrators whose preferences partially offset the influence of organized interests. The incentives described have implications for the selection of a whole range of bureaucratic personnel at various levels, generating significant implications for the study of public management on issues such as personnel administration, representative bureaucracy, and the devolution of administrative authority.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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