We analyze how the political preferences of CEOs affect their employees’ campaign contributions and electoral choices. Employees donate almost three times more money to CEO-supported political candidates than to candidates not supported by the CEO. This relation also holds around CEO departures, including plausibly exogenous departures due to death or retirement. CEO influence is strongest in firms that explicitly advocate for political candidates and firms with politically connected CEOs. Finally, employees are more likely to vote in elections in those congressional districts where CEOs are more politically active. Our results suggest that CEOs are a political force.
Employees donate more to their CEOs’ preferred political candidates
FEDASEYEU, VIKTAR;
2016
Abstract
We analyze how the political preferences of CEOs affect their employees’ campaign contributions and electoral choices. Employees donate almost three times more money to CEO-supported political candidates than to candidates not supported by the CEO. This relation also holds around CEO departures, including plausibly exogenous departures due to death or retirement. CEO influence is strongest in firms that explicitly advocate for political candidates and firms with politically connected CEOs. Finally, employees are more likely to vote in elections in those congressional districts where CEOs are more politically active. Our results suggest that CEOs are a political force.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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HBR_CEOsAndEmployees.pdf
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