In deciding whether to join a coalition or not, an agent must consider both i) the expected power of the coalition and ii) her position in the vertical structure within the coalition. We establish the existence of a positive relationship between the degree of inequality in remuneration within coalitions and the number of coalitions to be formed endogenously in stable systems. We show that such coalitions can be mixed and balanced, rather than segregated, in terms of members’ ability levels. In any stable system each coalition is of an efficient size and every agent is paid her marginal contribution.
Internal hierarchy and stable coalition structures
MORELLI, MASSIMO;
2016
Abstract
In deciding whether to join a coalition or not, an agent must consider both i) the expected power of the coalition and ii) her position in the vertical structure within the coalition. We establish the existence of a positive relationship between the degree of inequality in remuneration within coalitions and the number of coalitions to be formed endogenously in stable systems. We show that such coalitions can be mixed and balanced, rather than segregated, in terms of members’ ability levels. In any stable system each coalition is of an efficient size and every agent is paid her marginal contribution.File in questo prodotto:
File | Dimensione | Formato | |
---|---|---|---|
games and economic.pdf
non disponibili
Descrizione: articolo pubblicato
Tipologia:
Pdf editoriale (Publisher's layout)
Licenza:
NON PUBBLICO - Accesso privato/ristretto
Dimensione
282.69 kB
Formato
Adobe PDF
|
282.69 kB | Adobe PDF | Visualizza/Apri |
I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.