Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento:
|Titolo:||Political support and tax reforms in Italy|
|Data di pubblicazione:||2016|
|Autori interni:||PROFETA, PAOLA ANTONIA|
|Titolo del libro:||Political economy of tax reforms. Proceedings of the workshop organised by the Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN) held in Brussels on 19 October 2015|
|Abstract:||Tax systems are a major part of our economic systems. How to design and implement tax reforms is at the core of economic policy. Tax systems and tax reforms are also a highly debated topic worldwide and one where political aspects become crucial (Profeta and Scabrosetti, 2010). On one side, the political process shapes tax design, the main features of the tax systems and the direction of reforms. On the other side, in democracies, tax reforms need the support of voters in order to be implemented. Policymakers try to design a tax system and to propose tax reforms to attract and please as many voters as possible. Thus, tax reforms can be seen as a response to political constraints (see Winer et al., 2013 for a comprehensive bibliography on the topic of political economy of taxation). The debate on tax design and tax reforms includes issues such as complexity (Galli and Profeta, 2009), progressivity, efficiency and the level of the top rates, the optimal tax mix and possible shifts from labour income to consumption taxes (see Arnold et al., 2011). One crucial issue is the optimal versus actual tax design and reforms: why there is often a gap between the efficiency and fairness prescriptions based on standard economy theory and actual tax systems? Political constraints may account for a large part of this gap. In Italy, the political debate around issues of taxation is particularly strong. According to Eurostat, the Italian total fiscal pressure is around 43%, versus the EU-28 average of 39%, and total tax receipts are 30% versus EU-28 average of 26.5%. In times of zero growth, the debate on how to incentivize labour supply and investments, and what is the potential role of taxes in this final goal becomes a central one. This short article presents some evidence on the action of political constraints in shaping tax reforms with a particular focus on the Italian case. After presenting a few general lessons drawn from a broad analysis on European labour taxes (section 2), we introduce a simple framework, which helps understand how political constraints may shape the equilibrium in taxation (section 3). In section 4, we present a case study focused on a personal income tax reform in Italy, together with some other examples drawn from the Italian case on the role of political constraints in shaping tax reforms. Section 5 conclude.|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||62 - Proceedings / Presentations|
- PubMed Central loading...
I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.