The graph theoretic concept of maximal independent set arises in several practical problems in computer science as well as in game theory. A maximal independent set is defined by the set of occupied nodes that satisfy some packing and covering constraints. It is known that finding minimum and maximum-density maximal independent sets are hard optimization problems. In this paper, we use cavity method of statistical physics and Monte Carlo simulations to study the corresponding constraint satisfaction problem on random graphs. We obtain the entropy of maximal independent sets within the replica symmetric and one-step replica symmetry breaking frameworks, shedding light on the metric structure of the landscape of solutions and suggesting a class of possible algorithms. This is of particular relevance for the application to the study of strategic interactions in social and economic networks, where maximal independent sets correspond to pure Nash equilibria of a graphical game of public goods allocation.

Statistical mechanics of maximal independent sets

Pin, Paolo;
2009

Abstract

The graph theoretic concept of maximal independent set arises in several practical problems in computer science as well as in game theory. A maximal independent set is defined by the set of occupied nodes that satisfy some packing and covering constraints. It is known that finding minimum and maximum-density maximal independent sets are hard optimization problems. In this paper, we use cavity method of statistical physics and Monte Carlo simulations to study the corresponding constraint satisfaction problem on random graphs. We obtain the entropy of maximal independent sets within the replica symmetric and one-step replica symmetry breaking frameworks, shedding light on the metric structure of the landscape of solutions and suggesting a class of possible algorithms. This is of particular relevance for the application to the study of strategic interactions in social and economic networks, where maximal independent sets correspond to pure Nash equilibria of a graphical game of public goods allocation.
2009
2009
Dall'Asta, Luca; Pin, Paolo; Ramezanpour, Abolfazl
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11565/3991347
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