The best shot game applied to networks is a discrete model of many processes of contribution to local public goods. It generally has a wide multiplicity of equilibria that we refine through stochastic stability. We show that, depending on how we define perturbations – i.e., possible mistakes that agents make – we can obtain very different sets of stochastically stable states. In particular and non-trivially, if we assume that the only possible source of error is that of a contributing agent that stops doing so, then the only stochastically stable states are Nash equilibria with the largest contribution.

Stochastic stability in best shot network games

Pin, Paolo
2012

Abstract

The best shot game applied to networks is a discrete model of many processes of contribution to local public goods. It generally has a wide multiplicity of equilibria that we refine through stochastic stability. We show that, depending on how we define perturbations – i.e., possible mistakes that agents make – we can obtain very different sets of stochastically stable states. In particular and non-trivially, if we assume that the only possible source of error is that of a contributing agent that stops doing so, then the only stochastically stable states are Nash equilibria with the largest contribution.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11565/3991332
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