We consider a decision maker who ranks actions according to the smooth ambiguity criterion of Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005). An action is justifiable if it is a best reply to some belief over probabilistic models.We show that higher ambiguity aversion expands the set of justifiable actions. A similar result holds for risk aversion. Our results follow from a generalization of the duality lemma of Wald (1949) and Pearce (1984).
A note on comparative ambiguity aversion and justifiability
BATTIGALLI, PIERPAOLO;CERREIA VIOGLIO, SIMONE;MACCHERONI, FABIO ANGELO;MARINACCI, MASSIMO
2016
Abstract
We consider a decision maker who ranks actions according to the smooth ambiguity criterion of Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005). An action is justifiable if it is a best reply to some belief over probabilistic models.We show that higher ambiguity aversion expands the set of justifiable actions. A similar result holds for risk aversion. Our results follow from a generalization of the duality lemma of Wald (1949) and Pearce (1984).
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