The importance of seigniorage relative to other sources of government revenue differs markedly across countries. This paper tries to explain this regularity by studying a political model of tax reform. The model implies that countries with a more unstable and polarized political system will have more inefficient tax structures and, thus, will rely more heavily on seigniorage. This prediction of the model is tested on cross-sectional data for 79 countries. We find that, after controlling for other variables, political instability is positively associated with seigniorage. (JEL E52, E62, F41)
Seigniorage and Political Instability
TABELLINI, GUIDO
1992
Abstract
The importance of seigniorage relative to other sources of government revenue differs markedly across countries. This paper tries to explain this regularity by studying a political model of tax reform. The model implies that countries with a more unstable and polarized political system will have more inefficient tax structures and, thus, will rely more heavily on seigniorage. This prediction of the model is tested on cross-sectional data for 79 countries. We find that, after controlling for other variables, political instability is positively associated with seigniorage. (JEL E52, E62, F41)
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